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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A NEW TWIST TO THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION-Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc.
INTRODUCTION

Slightly more than two decades have passed since the United
State Supreme Court in New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan' began
limiting state defamation laws by redefining the body of common
law defamation in terms of first amendment protection. Since New
York Times the Supreme Court has continued to limit state defamation law, and to extend the "actual malice standard,"' as developed in New York Times, to other defamation cases.3 However, the
degree of first amendment protection afforded defamatory speech
is unclear. Balancing the state interest in protecting citizens from
defamatory speech, on one side, against the constitutional interest
in free speech, on the other, has posed a precarious dilemma for
the Supreme Court. The Court has been faced with deciding which
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. The "actual malice standard" developed in New York Times required
clear and convincing proof that a defamatory falsehood, alleged as libel, was uttered with "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not." 376 U.S. at 280.
3. In the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated
Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the "actual malice standard" was applied to
public figures. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the
"actual malice standard" to a news report of a matter of public interest, although
i private individual was involved. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971), suggested that the New York Times rule apply to all communication and
discussion involving matters of public or general concern, regardless of whether
the person is famous or anonymous. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323
(1974), while not expressly overruling Rosenbloom, limited its scope. Gertz held
that where a private individual was involved in a defamation action the statutes
could not impose liablility without fault. The state of the law after Gertz required
that a public figure must prove actual malice to recover in a defamation action,
whereas a private plaintiff needed only to prove the degree of fault chosen by the
particular state-usually simple negligence. But to recover presumed or punitive
damages the private plaintiff needed to show "actual malice."
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of these competing interests is greater, and what facts and circumstances justify a shift in their importance.4 Given the opportunity
to clarify this area of the law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1983 to Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet,Inc.5
The Court in Dun & Bradstreet' held that a private person need
not show "actual malice" to recover presumed and punitive damages when the matter involves a private concern. 7 The Court reasoned that presumed and punitive damages for defamatory statements that do not involve matters of public concern do not violate
the first amendment freedom of speech, even absent a showing of
"actual malice." 8
The Court in Dun & Bradstreet deceptively followed prior
defamation cases by extending the test to define the parameters of
first amendment protection of libelous speech. While having the
potential to clarify this area of the law, the decision in Dun &
Bradstreet has only added to the already complex matrix of considerations9 (see Diagram I) involved in determining the scope of
first amendment restrictions on state defamation laws. The case
brings increased difficulty in predicting what libels will be subject
4. Compare Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) with Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
5. 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 389 (1983).
6. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
7. Id. at 2948.
8. Id.
9. Factors which have been considered in prior cases include the distinction
between public/private individuals, New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) and media/non-media defendants. Compare Stuempges v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980) with Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md.
580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976) (see infra note 70). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
418 U.S. 323 (1974). Throughout the opinion for the Court in Gertz, Justice Powell spoke in terms of "publishers and broadcasters", the "press and broadcast media", and "communications media."
The distinction between public and private concerns has also been noted in
the case law. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). But, after Gertz, the distinction between public/private matters alone was not enough to decide whether one would be held to
the "actual malice" standard.
See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 4373 (1986),
which ruled unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute giving the defendant in a
defamation action the burden of proving the truth of allegedly defamatory statements. The Court noted that where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern about a private person, the private plaintiff cannot recover damages without
also showing the statements made by the defendant were false. 106 S.Ct. at 1559.
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to presumed and punitive damages without the proof of "actual
malice" as defined in New York Times v. Sullivan. °
DIAGRAM I: MATRIX OF FACTORS

/

MediaNon-mdia
Defendant
/
Defendant

Public Plaintiff

Private Concern
Private Plaintiff
public Concern

This Note will illustrate how Dun & Bradstreet immensely elevates the distinction between public and private concerns when
evaluating what speech deserves first amendment protection in
defamation cases. The main thrust is on the deficiencies of the
Dun & Bradstreet opinion, and how the Court, although given this
opportunity to clarify this area of the law, created greater confusion instead.
THE CASE

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., a credit reporting agency, erroneously" informed five subscribers of its credit reports that Greenmoss Builders, Inc., a construction contractor, had filed a volun10. Much of the difficulty in prediction comes with the subjective nature of
deciding what is a public concern and what is a private concern.
11. At trial it was established the error in Dun & Bradstreet's credit report
was caused when one of its employees, a seventeen year old high school student
paid to review Vermont bankruptcy pleadings, mistakenly attributed to Greenmoss Builders, Inc. a bankruptcy petition filed by former employee of Greenmoss.
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tary petition for bankruptcy. Greenmoss brought a defamation
action' 2 against Dun & Bradstreet claiming both compensatory and
punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict for Greenmoss and
awarded $50,000 compensatory or presumed damages and $300,000
punitive damages. Dun & Bradstreet moved for a new trial arguing
that the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc."' had ruled broadly that the states may not permit recovery of
presumed or punitive damages in libel actions, at least when liability is not based on a showing of "actual malice." 1' 4 Dun & Bradstreet contended the trial court allowed the jury to award damages
to Greenmoss on a lesser showing.
The judge ordered a new trial, and Greenmoss appealed to the
Vermont Supreme Court. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's order for a new trial. 5 Basing its opinion on the
distinction between media and non-media defendants, the court
held that the ruling in Gertz was inapplicable to non-media defamation actions, and that this was such an action."6 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Gertz
17
applied to the facts in Dun & Bradstreet.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Vermont Supreme Court, holding Gertz inapplicable to Dun & Bradstreet, but
the Supreme Court's decision followed a totally different line of
reasoning from the Vermont court. The Supreme Court focused on
speech content in the context of public/private concerns. The
Court concluded that Greenmoss Builders could recover presumed
and punitive damages without showing that Dun & Bradstreet ac12. Greenmoss Builders filed suit after expressing its dissatification with Dun
& Bradstreet's refusal to divulge the names of the subscribers who received the
false credit reports.
13. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
14. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2942
(1985) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
15. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d
414 (1983).
16. The Vermont Supreme Court noted that while there may be some
problems in deciding when a defendant is media or non-media, that distinction
was not difficult to draw with credit reporting agencies which are in the business
of distributing to a limited number of subscribers financial information for a
handsome fee. The Court concluded that such firms are not "the type of media
worthy of first amendment protection as contemplated by New York Times." 143
Vt. at 73-74, 461 A.2d at 417-18.
17. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d
414, cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 389 (1983).
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ted with "actual malice," and that this did not violate the first
amendment because the defamatory statements published by Dun
& Bradstreet involved matters of private concern.18
BACKGROUND

Prior to the New York Times 9 case in 1964, defamation was

considered to be beyond the reach of first amendment protection." °
Under the common law, a defendant was held strictly liable for
intentional publication of all defamatory statements regardless of
fault.21 The only available defenses were truth or a successfully as-

serted privilege.2 2 Behind the notion of strict liability were a number of justifications, including the principle that the flow of information, especially about personalities, should be limited to the
truth.13 However, by adopting some conditional privileges, the
courts on occasion forced individual reputations to yield to other
societal needs.
For first amendment purposes the most important of these
common law privileges was that of "fair comment" on matters of
public concern. In its broadest application this common law privilege protected statements of opinion, but did not protect honest
misstatements of fact although they were of public issue. 2' In a minority of states, the privilege was extended to protect good faith
misstatements of fact concerning public officials, political candi18. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2948
(1985).
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964)

20. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952), where the Supreme
Court upheld a criminal libel statute against first amendment attack. Several decisions contained dicta implying that defamatory falsehoods were without constitutional protections. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 and n.10 (1961);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Pennekamp v. Flordia, 328
U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
21. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 at 804 (5th ed. 1984).
22. Id. at §§ 114-16 at 815-42.
23. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1358 n.7
(1975).
24. The leading case is Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir.
1893). See W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 113 at 813-15. The courts have had difficulty distinguishing between what is fact and what is opinion. See Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962).
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dates, community leaders, and others who took a public stance on
matters of public concern.2"
In 1964, the Court in New York Times broke with the common law rule of strict liability concerning defamation, holding that
the first amendment "prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual mal"Actual malice" was defined as making a defamatory stateice.'
false or with reckless disregard
ment "with knowledge that it was
27
of whether it was false or not."
Following New York Times, the broader first amendment
scope of the decision was noted.2 8 The Court, in reaching its decision in New York Times, stated that "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 2 9 This statement
left open a wide range of possible applications of the New York
Times "actual malice standard."
Further development came in 1967 when the Supreme Court
was afforded an opportunity to expand the coverage of the "actual
malice standard." The companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts and Associated Press v. Walker,30 extended the standard to
their fame, shape events in
all "public figures" who "by reason of
31
areas of concern to society at large."
Following the Butts and Walker decisions, the plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,32 in a highly criticized opinion,33
suggested that the "actual malice standard" should extend to libels
of any individual so long as the defamatory statements involved a
"matter of public or general concern. '34 However, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.3 5 soon made it clear that the scope of constitutionally
25. The leading case is Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281
(1908), where the court reasoned that the public welfare depended on open debate
about public issues and that the public welfare interest outweighed any reputational interests that might be harmed.
26. 376 U.S. at 280.
27. Id.
28. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221.
29. 376 U.S. at 270.

30. 388 U.S 130 (1967).
31. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).

32. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
33. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
34. 403 U.S. at 45.
35. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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protected speech did not extend as far as the Court in Rosenbloom
suggested.
The Gertz case was instituted when Elmer Gertz, a reputable
Chicago civil rights attorney, brought a libel suit in federal court
against the publishers of the American Opinion magazine, which
in 1969 described Gertz as a Communist and suggested his involvement in a Communist campaign against the police. 36 After the jury
returned a $50,000 verdict in favor of Gertz, the trial judge entered
a judgment not withstanding the verdict in favor of the publisher,
concluding that the New York Times "actual malice" standard applied. 37 Gertz appealed. 3 8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, basing its holding on Rosenbloom. 9 The Supreme
Court reversed. The Court stated that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the [s]tates may define for themselves
the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster
of [a] defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.'
The Court in Gertz rejected the reasoning of the Rosenbloom
plurality. Focusing on the old private individual versus public individual distinction,"1 the Court expressly rejected Rosenbloom's
"general or public interest test.'42 The Court noted that to extend
the New York Times standard to defamation actions of a private
person whenever an issue of public interest was involved would infringe to an unacceptable degree the state interest in compensating
private individuals for injury to their reputation. 3 The Court
stated that all private plaintiffs, regardless of their involvement in
matters of public interest or concern, must prove fault on the part
of the publisher, allowing the states to establish the precise degree
of fault required." Public officials and public figures were still re36. Id. at 325-27.
37. Id. at 329.
38. Id. at 330.
39. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
40. 418 U.S. at 347.
41. New York Times and the cases following put heavy reliance on the distinction between public and private individuals to determine when the "actual
malice standard" applied.
42. 418 U.S. at 346.
43. Id.
44. Simple negligence has usually been the standard set in the states. See
Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 402, 649 P.2d 462, 470 (1982); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 89 (Okla. 1976); Memphis Publishing Co. v.
Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 417 (Tenn. 1978); and Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co.,
86 Wash. 2d 439, 455, 546 P.2d 81, 85 (1976).
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quired by New York Times to prove "actual malice" to recover
damages in defamation actions.
Gertz however, went on to hold that in order for a private individual to recover presumed or punitive damages, he had to prove
"actual malice," and that a private plaintiff who could not prove
"actual malice" could only recover actual damages."" Thus, the
public/private person distinction which Rosenbloom had rendered
virtually meaningless was resurrected in Gertz. (See Diagram II.)
DIAGRAM II: DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION OF LIBELOUS SPEECH

New York Times

PUBLIC OFFICIALS

Actual malice must be shown
to collect any type of damages.

Butts and Walker

PUBLIC FIGURES

Actual malice must be shown
to collect any type of damages.

RSuggested
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
PUBLIC MATTERS

Rosenbloom

Gertz

PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

actual malice
must be shown to recover
any damages.

Actual malice must be shown to
collect presumed and punitive
damages.
Some degree of fault must be
shown to recover actual damages.
Actual malice need not be shown.

The line of cases from New York Times to Gertz drastically
reformed common law defamation by shielding defamation with
A minority of cases require a higher degree of fault than simple negligence,
providing media defendants a higher degree of protection. See Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Colo. 1982) and Peisner
v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 161-63, 266 N.W.2d. 693, 697-98
(1978).
45. 418 U.S. at 342-43.
46. Id. at 350.
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first amendment protection, but the extent of that protection was
not totally clear. After Gertz it was apparent that a public figure
must satisfy the New York Times "actual malice" standard to recover all damages.' 7 On the one hand, Gertz held that a private
individual need only prove the degree of fault provided by the particular state to recover actual damages.' But, Gertz went further
and stated that to recover punitive or presumed damages it was
necessary for the private plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to
meet the New York Times "actual malice" standard.' 9 (See Table
I.)
TABLE I: STATE OF THE LAW AFTER GERTZ

I

DAMAGES

PUBLIC PERSON

Actual

Actual Malice

Some degree of fault
established by each state

Presumed

Actual Malice

Actual Malice

Punitive

Actual Malice

Actual Malice

PRIVATE PERSON

The Gertz decision still left many questions unanswered. For
example, what was the role of a media/non-media defendant? Was
the distinction between a private and public interest valid? Was
the only crucial factor in awarding actual damages, without proving "actual malice," whether the plaintiff was a private or public
person? Was a person, public or private, ever entitled to presumed
or punitive damages in a defamation case absent proof the defend47. Id. at 342-43. Although no Supreme Court case addresses the situation
when a public person/private matter is involved, Gertz noted that the New York

Times standard defined the appropriate level of constitutional protection when a
public person was defamed. Public persons may only recover for injury to reputation by showing "actual malice." 418 U.S. at 342. Conceivably, the logic of Dun &
Bradstreet could be applied to the situation of public person/private concern.
However, since Dun & Bradstreet involved a private person the analogy is somewhat flawed. As Gertz pointed out, "private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving
of recovery." 418 U.S. at 345.
48. Id. at 347-50.
49. Id. at 350.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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ant acted with "actual malice"? With these questions setting the
stage, Dun & Bradstreet was granted writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. Dun & Bradstreet gave the Court a
prime opportunity to clarify the constitutional limits on state defamation laws.
ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet found Gertz inapplicable. The Court concluded "that permitting recovery of presumed
and punitive damages [by a private person plaintiff] in defamation
cases absent a showing of 'actual malice' does not violate the first
amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern."5 0 The Vermont Supreme Court had held
Gertz inapplicable in Dun & Bradstreet based on the fact that
Gertz did not apply to defamation actions concerning non-media
defendants. The Supreme Court reached the same result as the
state court, but no single rationale dominated the plurality's decision, and no member of the Court followed the state court's analysis regarding media/nonmedia defendants.
Justice Powell, speaking for the plurality, relied on the 1983
public employment law case of Connick v. Myers, 5 1 and held that
matters of private concern need not be given as much constitutional protection as matters of public concern.52 The Court noted
that Gertz struck a balance between two competing interests: the
state interest in protecting its private citizens and the first amendment's interest in free and robust speech. 53 Balancing the state interest against the same first amendment interest at stake in New
York Times, the Gertz Court held that a state could not allow a
private individual recovery of presumed or punitive damages absent a showing of "actual malice." 54 In Dun & Bradstreet the
Court noted that nothing in the Gertz opinion "indicated that this
same balance would be struck regardless of the type of speech involved."' 15 The Dun & Bradstreet plurality concluded that where
speech does not involve matters of public concern, "the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive dam50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

105 S. Ct. at 2948.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
105 S. Ct. at 2945.
Id. at 2944-45.
418 U.S. at 349.
105 S. Ct. at 2944.
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ages-even absent a showing of actual malice." 56
Chief Justice Burger and Justice White concurred in separate
opinions. Both Justices agreed with the plurality's "private/public
concern" rationale. Yet, the concurring opinions went further to
say that New York Times should be re-examined and that Gertz
should be overruled.57 In urging the Court to reject Gertz, Justice
White based his reasoning on the premise that the public's interests set forth in New York Times did not tilt the scales in favor of
first amendment protection when a private individual was involved.58 White, in his dissent in Gertz, had stated that the common law remedies should be retained for private plaintiffs-regardless of the concern involved. 9
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, stated alliance to the
principles of New York Times." The dissent also expressed support for the Gertz holding that denied recovery of presumed and
punitive damages without proof of "actual malice."'" The dissent
strongly disagreed with the plurality's limits on first amendment
speech protection, specifically the plurality's "private/public concern" distinction. 2 The dissenters said such a standard would only
lead to confusion when trying to distinguish between a private
matter and a public concern. 6
Dun & Bradstreet substantially reinterpretes Gertz. The plurality opinion brings speech content into the spotlight as a means
to evaluate whether libelous speech is deserving of first amendment protections. Dun & Bradstreet draws a distinction for the
allowance of presumed and punitive damages to a private plaintiff
without proof of "actual malice" based upon whether the matter
involved is public or private. "Actual malice" must be shown for
matters of public concern, but is not required for private matters.
Although a public matter was involved in Gertz, the Court stated
without reference to public or private concerns, that private individuals could not recover presumed or punitive damages without
showing "actual malice.'3 Dun & Bradstreet puts a twist to Gertz,
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 2946.
Id. at 2948 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 2950 (White, J., concurring).
418 U.S. 373 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2954 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2959-60.
Id. at 2959-60 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
418 U.S. at 348-49.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986

11

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 7

538

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:527

by immensely elevating the "public/private concern" distinction.
While the division between public concerns and private concerns
existed in the Court's rationale in prior libel cases,65 Dun & Bradstreet catapults speech content into the already existing matrix of
factors"6 to be considered when evaluating whether libelous speech
is afforded first amendment protection when a private individual is
involved.
Along with holding that the states could not impose liability
without fault, Gertz ruled that in defamation suits by private individuals the states could not permit recovery of presumed and punitive damages unless "actual malice" was shown." Dun & Bradstreet holds that "actual malice" need not be proven to collect
presumed or punitive damages when the defamatory statements
about a private person do not involve matters of public concern. 8
What was thought to be blanket protection against presumed and
punitive damages where "actual malice" cannot be shown, actually
is only a protection in those situations where a private individual is
defamed about a matter of public concern. Fault must be shown,
but it does not have to rise to the degree of actual malice for the
private individual to collect presumed or punitive damages. This is
a substantial reinterpretation of Gertz. (See Table II which illustrates how the damage recoveries for presumed and punitive damages are split after Dun & Bradstreet and compare it with Table
I.)

65.
66.
67.
68.

See
See
418
105

Time, Inc. v.'Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-89 (1967).
supra note 9.
U.S. at 346.
S. Ct. at 2948.
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TABLE II: STATE OF THE LAW AFTER DUN & BRADSTREET
DAMAGES
Actual

[

PUBLIC PERSON

PRIVATE PERSON

Actual Malice

Some degree of fault
established by each state
Public Concern
Actual Malice

Presumed

Actual Malice
Private
Concern
Fault but no
malice
Public Concern
Actual Malice

Punitive

Actual Malice
Private
Concern
Fault but no
malice

In Dun & Bradstreet the Court adopted a two tier process of
evaluating cases where a private individual has been defamed. Step
one is deciding whether the person is a public individual or a private individual. If a public individual, the plaintiff must show "actual malice" in order to collect any type of damages.6 9 If the person
is a private individual the court takes the second step and asks:
Does this case involve a matter of public or private concern? If a
private concern exists then the court allows presumed and punitive
damages without proof of "actual malice." (See Diagram III.)

69. Any damages: actual, punitive, compensatory or presumed.
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DIAGRAM III
TWO TIER PROCESS OF EVALUATING
DEFAMATION SITUATIONS
STEP I
Query:

Is the person
defamed a public

or a private
individual?

PUBLIC INDIVIDUAL

PRIVATE INDIVIDUALI

Actual malice

STEP

recover all damages

Query: Does the case

at

must be shown to
involve a public
or private concern?

PUBLIC CONCERN

PRIVATE CONCERN

Actual malice
to recover
presumed and
punitive
damages

No actu
al ayice
required to
recover presumed
and punitive
damages

The Court in Dun & Bradstreet was given an excellent opportunity to explain the scope of first amendment protection of defamatory speech and to clarify this area of the law. However, the
Court failed to do so. The opinion is deficient in several ways.
Dun & Bradstreet's most severe shortcoming is that it failed
to give the practicing bar an expository precedent by which attorneys can advise both their media and non-media clients about potential libels that may be subject to presumed and punitive damages. While giving a new factor to consider in evaluating private
defamation actions, the Dun & Bradstreet opinion fails to clarify
the area of first amendment protection of libelous speech.
The Court's failure to treat the media/non-media defendant
question ignored an issue which has been a deciding factor in lower
court cases,70 including the Dun & Bradstreet decision by the Ver70. Compare Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 883 (1982) (Gertz held to be inapplicable to private figure suits against
non-media defendants); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn.
1980) (same); Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978) (same); and Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977)
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mont Supreme Court.7" The Vermont Supreme Court noted that in
non-media defamation actions the critical elements which brought
the United States Supreme Court into the law of defamation were
missing. There were no threats to free and robust debate of public
issues, no potential interference with meaningful dialogue of ideas
concerning self-government, and no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press.72 The Supreme Court did
not even address the media/non-media defendant question, even
after the Court specifically limited the arguments in the briefs to
media/non-media and commercial speech issues.7 3 Had the Court
addressed these issues, much of the confusion in applying Gertz
could have been resolved. The Court's formulation of a new rationale without the benefit of opposing views will eventually bring up
questions and problems that could have been avoided if only the
Court had addressed the media/non-media defendant problem in
its opinion. The question now is whether the distinction between
media and non-media remains a consideration because of the
Court's heavy focus on the "private/public concern."'74 The Court
should have taken the opportunity to say whether the media/nonmedia distinction makes any difference.
Even after choosing to focus on the private versus public concern, the Court failed to provide sufficient guidelines to distinguish
the "private" from the "public" concern.76 Quoting from Connick
(same); with Antwerp Diamond Exchange v. Better Business Bureau, 130 Ariz.
523, 637 P.2d 733 (1981) (Gertz held applicable in situations involving non-media
defendants) and Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976)
(same); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.Ct. at 2942 n.1.
71. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d
414 (1983).
72. Id. at 74, 461 A.2d at 418.
73. Not only was the briefing limited to media/non-media and commercial
speech issues, but the Vermont Supreme Court, in holding Gertz inapplicable,
had based its decision on the media/non-media distinction. From all indications
the media/non-media issue should have at least been addressed.
74. Since the Court did not address the media/non-media issue, the importance of the distinction is questionable. But see Philadephia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1565 n.4 (1986) (where the Court, in requiring a private
plaintiff to bear the burden of proving the falsity of allegedly defamatory statements concerning a public matter, refused to consider what standards would apply if a plaintiff sued a non-media defendant). Did the Court in Dun & Bradstreet choose not to reach the issue because the Court thought it unimportant? Or
is the distinction still valid?
75. 105 S. Ct. at 2959-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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v. Myers, 76 the Court said only that "whether [the] speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the expression's content, form, and context as revealed by the whole record. ' 77 The Court neglected to expand upon this criteria on which
it relied.
Applying this ostensibly vague criteria to the case at bar, the
Court simply took the false credit report and reasoned that such a
report was "speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker
and its specific business audience, 7 8 without fully considering
what factors may be evaluated in determining which matters may
be classified as a public concern. Further, the decision provides no
guidance as to when a private news story becomes a public concern, or as to whether a public concern becomes "public" just because the public is interested in the matter.
As the dissent pointed out,7 9 the Dun & Bradstreet plurality
opinion resembled the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.8 0 Rosenbloom's plurality suggested that first amendment protection of defamatory speech expand to all cases involving
the communication or discussion of "public issues," regardless of
whether the plaintiff was a public or private individual. Gertz rejected Rosenbloom's rationale,8 1 finding that the Rosenbloom standard would unacceptably impinge upon the states' legitimate interest in protecting its private citizens. 2 Gertz was also critical of
Rosenbloom's "public or general interest" test because of its subjective nature and because it would occasion judges to decide on an
83
ad hoc basis which publications address issues of public concern.
Dun & Bradstreet will undoubtedly resurrect the same deficiencies
the Gertz opinion found in Rosenbloom.
Dun & Bradstreet also creates the same potential for inconsistency as Rosenbloom. The subjective nature of deciding what is a
public or private concern will undoubtedly lead to ad hoc decision
making. The discretion given to judges to decide what is a public
or private concern will inevitably spawn inconsistent decision making in the lower courts as lawyers and judges attempt to explore
76. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
77. 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
78. Id. at 2947.
79. Id. at 2959-60 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
81. 418 U.S. at 346.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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the parameters of the Dun & Bradstreet decision. However, Dun &
Bradstreet is not a return to Rosenbloom. Dun & Bradstreet advances both a distinction between public/private individuals and a
distinction between public/private concerns. Rosenbloom advocated only a distinction between the latter.
The result reached in Dun & Bradstreet is correct when considering the reasoning of precedent cases. 4 The state interest in
compensating private individuals for injury to their reputations
supports awarding presumed and punitive damages even absent a
showing of "actual malice" when the defamatory speech is of a
purely private nature. As opposed to speech dealing with public
concerns, the value of speech on matters of a purely private concern receives reduced constitutional value. Constitutional protection of speech on a private matter does not further first amendment concerns for free and open debate of public issues and the
free exchange of ideas. Restating the Dun & Bradstreet holding to
give it deference to the prior case law: A private person or company should be allowed to recover presumed and punitive damages
from a non-media defendant" 5 for libelous speech containing matters of private concern without having to prove "actual malice."
Neither of the concurring opinions were correct in their attempt to justify the disposition. Both Chief Justice Burger's and
Justice White's opinions sought a re-examination of Gertz and
New York Times-suggesting specifically that Gertz be overruled.
Based on a long line of case law which affords a broad range of
speech protected by the first amendment, 86 the Court would find it
hard to justify overturning these precedents. The dissent gives the
plurality valid criticisms, but the dissent would expand first
amendment protection too far. By strictly adhering to New York
Times and Gertz, the dissent's approach would blindly apply pre84. The New York Times rationale was grounded on "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open." 376 U.S. at 270. Gertz went further on this notion of
"open debate on public issues" and reasoned that defamatory statements made
about a private person concerning a public issue were deserving of some first
amendment protections. However, Gertz did involve a public matter, and the
Court was not faced with the situation of a private plaintiff bringing a defamation
action when a private matter is involved.
85. Since the Court did not consider the media/non-media defendant issue
the question may still be posed: "What result if Dun & Bradstreet clearly involved a media defendant?"
86. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
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cedent to defamation cases which involve other facts and
considerations.8 7
CONCLUSION

Dun & Bradstreet allows a private individual to recover presumed and punitive damages without showing "actual malice"

when the matter involves a private concern. The plurality opinion
focuses on speech content as a means to evaluate whether libelous
speech is deserving of first amendment protection. Dun & Bradstreet immensely elevates the "public/private concern" distinction.
While that concern has existed in the Court's rationale in prior
libel cases, Dun & Bradstreetcatapults speech content into the already existing matrix of factors considered when evaluating
whether libelous speech is afforded first amendment protection
when a private individual is defamed.
Dun & Bradstreet is not a return to Rosenbloom, the case
merely gives Gertz a new twist. Gertz held there could be no presumed or punitive damages without showing "actual malice." Dun
& Bradstreet agrees with this holding, but allows private individuals presumed or punitive damages where the defamatory publication involves a matter of private concern without showing "actual
malice." (See Diagram IV.) The Gertz requirement that a private
person must show some fault to recover in a defamation action still
applies.

87. Strict application of New York Times and Gertz would eliminate the consideration of the state interest in protecting its private citizens from defamatory
statements. As the majority stated in Gertz, the Court would not lightly require
the states to abandon this interest. 418 U.S. at 342. Quoting Justice Stewart, the
majority noted that the individual's right to the protection of his own good name
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of
every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (as
quoted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 324, 342 (1974)).
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DIAGRAM IV
THE EFFECT OF DUN & BRADSTREET
ON GERTZ
DUN & BRADSTREET

PUBLIC CONCERN

GERTZ

No presumed or punitive
damages without showing
actual malice

No presumed or punitive
damages without showing
actual malice

PRIVATE CONCERN
Presumed and punitive
damages without showing
actual malice

Dun & Bradstreet appears to be a retreat in the Court's move88
ment to protect defamatory speech under the first amendment.
From all indications in the Gertz opinion, a private person, just
like the public person, would be required to prove "actual malice"
to recover presumed and punitive damages. Dun & Bradstreet expressly holds that a private person need not prove this higher degree of culpable conduct to recover presumed and punitive damages. As long as liability is not imposed without showing fault, the
state common law remains intact when a private person is defamed
about a matter of private concern.
Dun & Bradstreet makes it easier for private plaintiffs to recover presumed and punitive damages in defamation actions when
the matter is a private concern. However, the subjective nature of
what is a private and what is a public concern will undoubtedly be
the most troublesome aspect in application of the Dun & Bradstreet decision. Judges will often be required to use hindsight to
evaluate what is public and what is private. This will inevitably
lead to ad hoc decisions at the appellate as well as the trial level.
Dun & Bradstreet leaves several questions unanswered: What
is the effect of having a media defendant? What facts need be con88. But see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986),

where the Court decided a private person is required to bear the burden of proving the falsity of allegedly defamatory statements concerning a public matter
before recovery of damages will be allowed.
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sidered in deciding what is a public concern? When does a private
news story become a public concern? Is a private/public concern
now the only factor to consider in determining when the first
amendment will protect defamatory statements when a private individual is defamed? Does the decision have any effect on defamation actions involving public officials or public figures?
When Dun & Bradstreet was granted certiorari in 1983, it was
projected that at least some of these unanswered questions would
be addressed and resolved. Given this golden opportunity to define
the scope of first amendment limits on state defamation laws, the
Supreme Court skirted several central issues and raised issues and
questions that did not even exist prior to the decision.
Benita A. Lloyd
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